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Although, the following discussion is fictional, it describes actual
events. The information in this Essay is true and current as of
February 7, 1994, and is documented in sources on file with the
Author. Japan and Germany are not currently permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council so only nine, not ten votes, are pres-
ently required by article 27for approval of resolutions.
Ms. Jarring (Sweden): The Security Council has before it a draft
resolution calling for enforcement action against Ukraine to counter the
perceived danger posed by the continued operation of two reactors at
Chernobyl and the deterioration of the two nonoperational reactors.
Ukraine has engaged in environmental and military blackmail for several
years over control of its nuclear hazards, its parliament demanding "ma-
terial compensation" of three billion dollars in foreign aid for its "mate-
rial wealth" of strategic nuclear weapons. Since 1991 the global
community has pressured the country to relinquish the 1800 strategic
nuclear warheads from 176 intercontinental missiles and from air-
launched cruise missiles that it retained after the disintegration of the
Soviet Union. The warheads themselves are reportedly decaying and im-
properly maintained. The Ukrainian Parliament has yet to ratify the nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and initially imposed thirteen
conditions on its ratification of the START I nuclear arms reduction
treaty before implementation would begin. START I was not ratified
until February 4, 1994 and full compliance remains uncertain.
The immediate danger to which the resolution is addressed, how-
ever, is the hazardous operation and maintenance of the civilian reactors
at Chernobyl. Of the four original reactors at Chernobyl, the wreckage
of the unit where the 1986 accident occurred is leaking radioactive waste
into the Pripyat marshlands. A fire prompted the closure of a second
unit. Ukraine has not abandoned its intention to restart that unit. In-
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deed, despite assertions to the contrary in 1991 and 1992, Ukraine an-
nounced its decision in 1993 to continue operation of the remaining two
units that lack containment structures. Ukraine asserts an intention to
shut down the reactors at some point in the undefined future as a justifi-
cation for its failure to spend money in improving them. Meanwhile, the
country's chaotic economy holds little promise of improvement in the
near future. The ongoing Chernobyl clean up already consumes more
than ten percent of the national budget. Radiation meters routinely
show radiation five to ten times normal background levels and, at some
spots, readings up to 5000 times higher than normal have been recorded.
The most highly radioactive waste from the accident is buried in over
600 dump sites dug quickly after the disaster. In the summer of 1993,
6000 hectares of highly contaminated pine forest caught fire, spewing
radioactive dust over the area. Monitoring of health and environmental
data from the last accident must be done immediately if the impact of
these problems is ever to be assessed accurately.
Against this background, continued operation of the reactors is a
disaster waiting to happen. Officials discovered in the fall of 1993 that
thieves apparently stole two uranium-filled reactor control rods from
Chernobyl, but they are not even sure what year the theft took place.
Security is nonexistent, safety standards are lax, and the morale and
qualifications of personnel are low. Indeed, the manager of the
Chernobyl plant in 1986 had previously been in charge of a heating plant.
The more highly qualified workers have left since that time due to rap-
idly deteriorating working conditions and living standards. Smuggling of
low-grade nuclear fuel and "dual use" metals, which can have industrial
or nuclear weapon application, have been documented by United States
and German officials. A report of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service
noted "the growing interest of international organized crime structures
in conducting illegal trade on fissionable and other especially dangerous
material, documentation on [weapons of mass destruction] technology,
and individual units for the manufacture of nuclear devices.", No one
fully knows what nuclear facilities exist in the former republics of the
Soviet Union. Fifty-megawatt nuclear research reactors were recently
"discovered" on military bases at Kazakhstan's Semipalatinsk test range
and Ukraine's Sevastapol naval base.
The draft resolution that I should like to place before the Council
reads as follows:
1. See Steve Coll, Nuclear Goods Traded in Post-Soviet Bazaar, WASH. POST, May 15,
1993, at A18.
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The Security Council,
Recalling the accident of April 26, 1986, at the Chernobyl
Nuclear Power Plant, which resulted in a release,
Expressing grave alarm at reports of improper and inade-
quate maintenance and operation of the plant, deterioration in
these conditions, and in the structures themselves,
Determining that this situation constitutes a threat to in-
ternational peace and security,
Committing to take effective measures to eliminate the im-
minent risk of another accident occurring,
Believing that the establishment of a committee of experts
will contribute to ensuring that such risk is eliminated,
Acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations,
1. Resolves to appoint a committee of experts who, with
the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), shall investigate, as well as receive and hear evidence,
statements, and testimonies on the conditions of operation and
maintenance of the four Chernobyl nuclear reactors, and who
shall report to the Security Council at the earliest possible time
on the measures to be taken in order to ensure that any unrea-
sonable risk of an accident occurring is eliminated;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to implement urgently
the present resolution and, in particular, to make practical ar-
rangements for the effective functioning of the committee at the
earliest time and to report periodically to the Council.
The Security Council does not have to wait to act until an invasion
has begun or a nuclear accident has occurred. Whatever degree of immi-
nence is necessary for states to act in individual or collective self-defense
need not exist for there to be a "threat to peace" within the meaning of
chapter VII.2 The Security Council was created to avert, as well as to
remedy, disaster. If Ukraine is unwilling to act in an environmentally
responsible manner with respect to these hazards, it is the responsibility
of the Council to compel complete inspection and even mandate closure
if warranted by the conditions.
2. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. Article 39 provides that "the Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measure shall be taken.., to maintain or restore
international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
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Ms. Mironova (Ukraine): First and foremost, every state has a right
to decide matters of vital national security free from outside interference.
Ukraine wants to be responsible for its own self-defense, rather than be
dependent upon the assistance of other states. There are many elements
of the former Soviet Union's government as well as right-wing national-
ists who continue to vie for control of Russia's future. The draft resolu-
tion before us is a thinly veiled attempt by some members of this Council
to dictate how Ukraine should resolve these sensitive issues of strategic
national defense. The enforcement powers of this Council are broad but
not limitless. However expansive the terms "breach of peace" or "act of
aggression" may be, they have never been interpreted to encompass a
state's failure to ratify a disarmament treaty or to abide by its terms. If
so, we submit that many members of this Council are subject to sane-
tions-nonnuclear and nuclear states for their failure to ratify the NPT,
and nuclear states for their failure to pursue a "treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" as
required by article VI of that treaty.
3
Even more clearly, the three key terms in chapter VII4 have never
been used to justify enforcement action against a state to counter an envi-
ronmental threat in the absence of military conflict. Even if this resolu-
tion emanated solely from concern over continued operation of the
Chernobyl reactors, the decision to continue operation is integral to our
state's right to pursue its own development. Principle 2 of the Rio Dec-
laration,5 the updated version of principle 21 of the Stockholm Declara-
tion,6 not only reaffirms the right to development, but strengthens it. It
provides that states have the sovereign right to exploit their own re-
sources "pursuant to their own environmental and development poli-
cies." 7 Under principle 6 the needs of developing countries must be
given "special priority."8 Principle 11, which requires states to enact ef-
3. Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Mar. 5, 1970, 729 U.N.T.S. 169,
173.
4. The three key terms are: (1) threat to the peace; (2) breach of the peace; and (3) act of
aggression. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
5. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 2, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.151/Rev.1 13 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration], reprinted in THE EARTH SUMMIT:
THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCED)
118, 118 (1993) [hereinafter EARTH SUMMIT].
6. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment, June 1, 1972, princ. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416
(1972).
7. Rio Declaration, supra note 5, princ. 2, reprinted in EARTH SUMMIT, supra note 5, at
118.
8. Id. princ. 6, reprinted in EARTH SUMMIT, supra note 5, at 119.
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fective environmental legislation, specifically notes that "[s]tandards ap-
plied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted
economic and social cost to other countries, in particular developing
countries." 9 The current economic crisis and the country's need for
power and heat mandate continued dependence on these plants at this
time. We cannot afford to complete new reactors under construction or
pay to import oil and gas from Russia or elsewhere.
There is no justification for singling out Ukraine on any grounds.
Of the three former Soviet republics that retained nuclear weapons, Be-
larus was the first to ratify START I and accept status as a nonnuclear
party to the NPT. Kazakhstan, the first Moslem state to be an independ-
ent nuclear power, ratified START I but did not ratify the NPT until
December 1993. Neither state-as a nonnuclear state-has completed a
comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In a gesture of our
good faith, at the end of 1993, we began dismantling the ten-warhead SS-
24 missiles targeted at North American sites, and on February 4, 1994
our parliament ratified START I.
Russia has eleven reactors identical to the one that exploded in
Chernobyl. The RBMKs, the oldest Russian reactors, have no contain-
ment structures and are operating throughout the former Soviet bloc. A
1993 World Bank-International Energy Agency report to the Group of
Seven economic summit stated that seven percent of all electrical-gener-
ating capacity in Russia, Armenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia, and
Ukraine is derived from RBMKs or the somewhat less dangerous VVER
reactors. Russia is attempting to demonstrate that some of the RBMKs
operating there can be upgraded to approximate Western safety stan-
dards. Russia has ten, known "secret cities" like Chelyabinsk-70,
Tomsk-7, and Krasnoyarsk-26, with a total population of about one mil-
lion living amid reactors and stockpiles of nuclear materials and waste,
which are still unmarked on any map. In 1993 alone there were at least
three accidents in Russian nuclear facilities that resulted in releases of
radioactivity. The Mayak plutonium-producing plant at Kyshtym alone,
the source of two accidents in 1957 and 1967 affecting 450,000 people in
an area the size of Maryland, is storing in unsecured conditions radioac-
tive materials equivalent to the fallout from twenty Chernobyl disasters.
Outside the former Soviet bloc, there are a number of states whose
decisions regarding civilian use of nuclear energy have raised serious en-
vironmental concerns. To give just one example, France, Russia, Japan,
and Britain each have programs to extract plutonium from used fuel to
9. Id. princ. 11, reprinted in EARTH SUMMIT, supra note 5, at 119-20.
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generate energy, despite criticism that reprocessing is environmentally
unsound and adds to the world stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium.
Mr. Yablokov (Russia): Although we do have eleven reactors like
that which exploded at Chernobyl, unlike Ukraine we have worked to fix
many design faults, install new computers, and improve safety proce-
dures and equipment.
The right to development in principle 21 of the Stockholm Declara-
tion, and principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, which Ukraine cites in its
defense, is qualified by an obligation to ensure that "activities within
their [states'] jurisdiction and control do not cause damage to the envi-
ronment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion." 0 In contrast to the Stockholm Declaration, the Rio Declaration
also adopts the "precautionary approach" to environmental problems for
measures to be taken against threats of serious or irreversible damage
even in the face of scientific uncertainty. More specifically, principle 19
requires states to "provide prior and timely notification and relevant in-
formation to potentially affected States on activities that may have a sig-
nificant adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall consult
with those States at an early stage and in good faith.""1
Moreover, back-and-forth recitation of these often competing princi-
ples of the right to development and the obligation to preserve the envi-
ronment only confuses the question of the Security Council's authority to
intervene in this case. The prohibition in article 2, paragraph 7 of the
Charter against intervention in any state's domestic affairs contains an
explicit exception for application of enforcement measures under chapter
VII. 2 We are left, once again, with whatever limitations are imposed in
the key terms of chapter VII or the delineated purposes of the United
Nations.
There is no question that the "threat to peace" language authorizes
anticipatory action by the Security Council, but that begs the question of
whether the situation at Chernobyl is the type of situation appropriately
addressed as a threat to peace. We are not concerned here with an actual
accident that may or may not present a danger of transboundary radia-
tion. Nor is this a case of deliberate infliction of environmental damage
10. Id. princ. 2, reprinted in EARTH SUMMIT, supra note 5, at 118.
11. Id. princ. 19, reprinted in EARTH SUMMIT, supra note 5, at 121.
12. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (emphasis added).
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that might coincide with a threat to peace or breach of peace and, per-
haps, even an act of aggression. At most, we are evaluating the risk of an
accident with a risk of transboundary impact. How many other reactors
in how many other countries pose the same danger? The potential for
abuse of this authority is too great and the immediate justification too
weak.
Mr. Hamada (Japan): Ukraine's contention that the Council has
never taken enforcement action against a state for failure to be a party to
or abide by a disarmament treaty overlooked the debate over imposition
of economic sanctions on North Korea, prompted by its announcement
of its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Although North Korea's offer of unrestricted inspections of five of seven
nuclear-related sites averted sanctions in 1993; several events prolonged
the debate. These included the continuing crisis over the IAEA's decla-
ration in 1994 that safeguards against new plutonium production were
broken, North Korea's resistance to allowing inspection of a reactor in
Yongbyon containing spent fuel and a nearby facility for reprocessing the
plutonium-laden spent fuel, its ambiguity in allowing full inspection of its
other declared nuclear sites, its refusal to permit a special inspection by
the IAEA of two military facilities, and its renewed threats to withdraw
from the NPT. The two military facilities have never been open to inter-
national inspectors and are suspected of harboring nuclear wastes that
might provide evidence of how much plutonium for bombs has been pro-
duced. Although Japan wishes to pursue diplomatic negotiations first,
with sanctions as a last resort, this body clearly has the authority to take
chapter VII enforcement action against North Korea should negotiations
fail, or against Ukraine in the situation at hand.
Ms. Siegel (United States): In 1993 the United States and Ukraine
signed an agreement providing $175 million for dismantlement of nu-
clear weapons in addition to a pledge of $155 million in economic assist-
ance, both approved by Congress. This economic assistance is not,
however, unique. When Kazakhstan ratified the NPT, we signed an ac-
cord guaranteeing payment of at least seventy million dollars to destroy
the silos housing that state's 104 SS-18 missiles, each equipped with ten
warheads. We promised another $14.5 million to improve responses to
nuclear accidents, to create communications channels for reporting nu-
clear-related information, to safeguard warheads from theft and terror-
ism, and to tighten controls on exports of nuclear-related materials. On
January 14, 1994 Ukraine signed an accord to dismantle its nuclear arse-
nal within seven years in return for an array of potential economic assist-
ance, technical assistance, and security guarantees from the United
April 1994]
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States, as well as debt forgiveness for energy imports from Russia.
Shortly afterwards, its parliament approved the accord and ratified
START I.
The United States has demonstrated its commitment to doing every-
thing possible to minimize the risks of a global nuclear disaster. Accord-
ingly, we viewed North Korea's announced intention to withdraw from
the NPT as a matter of the utmost gravity. In 1989 the Yongbyon reac-
tor was shut down for 100 days, at which time North Korea admitted
diverting spent nuclear fuel to plutonium production. IAEA inspections
of the reactor and the processing facility in 1992 indicated that North
Korea made substantially more bomb-grade plutonium than it acknowl-
edged and turned over to the IAEA. Radioactive measurements from
nuclear particles on plant equipment and waste storage bins indicate
preprocessing of fuel in 1989, 1991, and 1992.
Fuel cannot be withdrawn unless the reactor is shut down, and U.S.
intelligence satellites can detect another cooling in the Pyongyang reac-
tor. IAEA inspectors must, however, conduct their own full inspections
of the reactor and nearby laboratory for reprocessing of spent fuel, as
well as special inspections of the two military sites where North Korea
may have hidden wastes from the extra reprocessing. Refueling of the
Pyongyang reactor is imminent. The IAEA needs to make detailed mea-
surements of radioactive emissions from the spent fuel withdrawn from
the reactor to assess how long it has been in the reactor. That assessment
would, in turn, enable inspectors to calculate how much spent fuel was
replaced in 1989 and thus how much was used to make weapons-grade
plutonium.
With both the situations in North Korea and Ukraine, the United
States wished to pursue diplomatic initiatives first and foremost, but we
have been disappointed in the progress of our initiatives. Regretfully, we
see the proposed resolution as a necessary step at this juncture to expe-
dite resolution of a rapidly deteriorating situation in Ukraine. Although
properly characterized as an enforcement action because its fulfillment is
not predicated on Ukraine's consent, I want to emphasize that the resolu-
tion is coercive only insofar as Ukraine refuses to cooperate with the
good faith efforts of this Council to assist the State in alleviating this
environmental hazard.
Mr. Liu (China): If anything, the Korean crisis is an example of
how this Council must be circumspect in the use of its chapter VII en-
forcement powers. After inflammatory statements by the American
President regarding U.S. retaliation, former U.S. Defense Secretary Les
Aspin acknowledged in 1993 that the situation with respect to North
[Vol. 27:893
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Korea's possible production of a nuclear device had not changed dramat-
ically since 1989. Article X of the NPT recognizes the right of a state to
withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.13 China has
favored an appropriate settlement to achieve a nonnuclear Korean penin-
sula, including withdrawal of U.S. nuclear forces, through dialogue, not
sanctions. We do not think the Council's involvement in the matter will
contribute to the settlement of that issue and find the reference to the
matter, in this context, inappropriate.
Mr. Draper (United Kingdom): North Korea justified its announced
intention to withdraw from the NPT as a measure of self-defense in the
exercise of its sovereignty. The United Kingdom questioned at the time
whether North Korea's allegations of U.S. aggression and IAEA bias
constituted "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the
treaty." In the current situation, once again we have a state asserting
that the path it pursues is a protected exercise of national sovereignty.
The claimed "right to development" is often asserted but never defined.
When Russia asserts that we are not dealing with a situation where an
accident has occurred, its representative ignores the fact that Europe and
the United Kingdom in particular have already been the victims of one
accident at Chernobyl, and conditions have only worsened since that
time. We are not willing to wait for a next time.
Mr. Graves (France): The situation with North Korea, and what
enforcement measures were or are being debated, is hardly precedent in
the Ukrainian situation. The Korean peninsula has been an area of spe-
cial concern to the U.N. ever since the General Assembly's recognition in
1948 of the government of the Republic of Korea as the only lawful gov-
ernment in Korea, and the Security Council resolution in 1950 condemn-
ing the North Korean invasion of South Korea as a breach of peace and
recommending that members furnish forces to assist the Republic under
the "unified command" of the United States. 14 Moreover, the Security
Council's recent concern with North Korea was not simply a question of
North Korea's failure to abide by the NPT. The escalation of tension
between North and South Korea over North Korea's possible develop-
ment of nuclear weapons carried with it a very real danger of military
conflict, accompanied by, at one time, a threat of U.S. retaliation by Pres-
ident Clinton if North Korea attacked South Korea with or without nu-
clear weapons.
13. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Mar. 5, 1970, art. 10, 729
U.N.T.S. 169, 175.
14. Security Council Resolution 84, July 7, 1950, para. 3, U.N. Doc. No. S/1588 (1950).
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The position of North Korea-purportedly premised on the partial-
ity of IAEA inspections and its impermissible investigation into military
secrets-presents the traditional scenario of potential military conflict
encompassed by the terms "threat to peace" or "breach of peace" under
chapter VII. At no point has any member of this Council predicated
enforcement action on the environmental threat posed by the graphite
reactors in North Korea, like those at Chernobyl. If this body is primar-
ily concerned about the arsenal of nuclear weapons in Ukraine or its fail-
ure to ratify the NPT, the declaration should so state and be debated on
those grounds rather than be put forward as environmental intervention.
France has been a leader in the development of safe, responsible use
of nuclear energy. It is not for this body to decide which sources of
energy a state should utilize. If this resolution is to be adopted, it must
be premised upon more than the environmental risks associated with nu-
clear energy or, for that matter, the risks inherent in any energy develop-
ment. If, however, this discussion demonstrates that Chernobyl presents
an unusual and unjustifiable risk of transboundary harm, we are pre-
pared to support the resolution.
Mr. Schulte (Germany): Germany has, on a number of occasions,
specifically requested that the RBMK reactors in operation throughout
the Commonwealth of Independent States, be closed down immediately.
The Western nuclear industry has indicated willingness to assist in re-
trofitting other reactors to continue their operation more safely, but on
the condition that it be indemnified against claims for compensation if
nuclear damage were to be caused by installations to which their supplies
and services have been provided. As things now stand, if an accident
were to occur, suppliers might be liable as a matter of domestic product
liability law or, in cases of supplier fault, general tort law. The CIS and
most East European states, unlike many Western states, have not enacted
special nuclear liability legislation placing liability solely on the operator
of a nuclear installation. Nor are most of these states parties to either the
Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear En-
ergy" or to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Dam-
age,16 which similarly limit liability to the operator. Security Council
intervention in the Ukrainian situation would allow the Western nuclear
15. Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29,
1960, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAM-
AGE (International Atomic Energy Agency Legal Series No. 4, rev. ed. 1976).
16. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE, supra note
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industry to provide its expertise to improve safety without incurring lia-
bility in the event of a nuclear accident.
Mr. Khan (Pakistan): As the Security Council has become more
active in taking enforcement measures, the stated grounds in its resolu-
tions for doing so have become less clear and-more often than not-
unstated. When economic sanctions were imposed on Southern Rhode-
sia in 1966, the Security Council was quite specific that it was acting
pursuant to articles 3917 and 41.18 Since then, in authorizing forces in
Somalia and Kuwait, in establishing "safe areas" in Bosnia, in imposing
sanctions on Haiti, and in establishing a war crimes tribunal for former
Yugoslavia, to give just a few examples, the Council has stated only that
it was "acting under chapter VII." The broad-based authorization of
chapter VII has been used to justify sanctions based on such diverse ac-
tions as Libya's refusal to turn over to Scotland or the United States
suspects in the Lockerbie bombing and the UNITA rebels' continuing
attacks in violation of a U.N.-brokered peace accord.
The Security Council is a political body, in which mixed motivations
for action are inevitable. It would be futile to try to inquire into the
motivation behind each resolution and vote. The Rhodesian sanctions,
the Security Council's first exercise of chapter VII enforcement powers,
is illustrative. Discussion in the Council focused on whether the risk of
violent reaction by Rhodesian Africans, neighboring states, or the United
Kingdom was concrete enough to constitute a threat to peace. Yet the
underlying concern was a human rights concern for the disenfranchise-
ment of ninety-four percent of Rhodesia's population by the white re-
gime. It would take twenty-six years before the Security Council would
explicitly acknowledge taking enforcement action based on humanitarian
concerns in the case of Somalia. The representative from France states
that energy concerns cannot be the predicate for enforcement action, and
yet one could argue that the most expansive enforcement action ever
taken, the war against Iraq, was driven by such concerns rather than the
aggression against Kuwait.
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 39 "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security." Id.
18. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of
the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
April 1994]
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The Security Council has already considered environmental con-
cerns within the scope of its chapter VII authority, albeit in a military
context. Resolution 687, which officially ended the Persian Gulf War
between Iraq and the United Nations Coalition Force, included environ-
mental remedies against Iraq. 9 Paragraph 16 states that Iraq is liable
under international law for any direct loss, including environmental
damage and depletion of natural resources.2" Paragraph 18 creates a
fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16, and
establishes a commission that will administer the fund.21 Under para-
graph 19, the Secretary-General is directed to present a recommendation
to the Security Council within thirty days of the adoption of Resolution
687 with mechanisms for the administration of the fund, and in particu-
lar, for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the
fund.22 Global interdependency in the so-called new world order has
made every crisis with potential international repercussions a "threat to
international peace." In truth, the only limitation on this Council's pow-
ers are the votes necessary to adopt any substantive resolution.
Mr. Vitelli (Italy): There are legal and practical limitations on the
enforcement powers of the Council beyond the voting requirements of
article 27.23 In initiating action, every international organization must
act within the confines of its stated purposes, or its actions are ultra vires.
The stated purposes of the United Nations in article 1 are maintenance of
international peace and security, development of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and promotion of human rights.24 Environ-
mental intervention raises serious implications of ultra vires action. Even
though the creation of the United Nations Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM) was in keeping with those purposes, the difficulties faced by
that mission highlight the practical difficulties involved in determining
the scope of authorized action. What began as a humanitarian mission
became at times a military confrontation with Mohammed Farah
Aideed's forces. Confusion in authority resulted in a vastly overextended
19. Security Council Resolution 687, Apr. 3, 1991, para. 16, U.N. Doc. No. S/RES/687
(1991).
20. Id.
21. Id. para. 18.
22. Id. para. 19.
23. Each Security Council member has one vote; nine affirmative votes are required for
Security Council procedural decisions; and nine affirmative votes are required for all other
decisions including the concurring votes of permanent members, except that, in decisions
under Chapter VI and under article 52(3), a party to a dispute shall abstain. U.N. CHARTER
art. 27.
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, paras. 1-3.
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and incohesive operation to make peace, establish a political process, and
rebuild a nation.
Peace-enforcement operations raise entirely new difficulties from
traditional peacekeeping operations. The United Nations is facing a se-
vere fiscal crisis. For instance, the United States alone in the fall of 1993
owed more than nine hundred million dollars. In August 1993 the U.N.
Headquarters staff, with fewer than eighty full-time employees, was over-
seeing 80,000 troops in fourteen separate operations. At this time as
never before, the Security Council must be circumspect in exercising its
powers and, when it does act, must write clearer mandates and set firm
guidelines for the inception and termination of U.N. involvement. This
is, however, a generic problem for every chapter VII enforcement action
and not one that precludes our support for initial authorization of this
action given the likelihood of the harm occurring and the extraordinary
risks posed by nuclear accidents.
Mr. Bogdan (Nauru): Increasingly, global and regional human
rights documents have included a right to a healthful environment. Al-
most every national constitution revised or adopted since 1960 has recog-
nized environmental concerns in some way. Although neither the
Stockholm nor Rio Declarations proclaims a right to a healthy environ-
ment, environmental degradation impedes a number of established
human rights including the right to life, right to health, right to adequate
working conditions, right to privacy, right to an adequate standard of
living, and right to information and participation in decision making. In
a 1990 proposal to the Commission on Human Rights, Ukraine itself
proposed a definition of environmental human rights which included the
right to participate in the solution of problems connected with technol-
ogy that might endanger the lives and health of people. If the Security
Council's powers are circumscribed only by the purposes set forth in the
Charter, protection of the global community from environmental disaster
falls within protection of human rights.
Mr. Odhiambo (Kenya): In 1967 the United Kingdom bombed a
Liberian oil tanker, the Torrey Canyon, which was grounded on the high
seas, in order to reduce pollution of its coasts. The customary law of the
sea, at least since that time, has arguably included a right of intervention
when a threat of pollution of a state's coastal zone presents a grave and
imminent danger. This right of intervention seems to have been predi-
cated on either the principle of necessity or self-defense. With the doc-
trine of necessity having fallen into disfavor in the post-Charter legal
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regime after the Corfu Channel case,25 this right of intervention may be
the harbinger of an expanded notion of self-defense or a new concept of
self-protection that goes beyond military attacks to encompass grave risk
of material environmental damage. If the right is triggered by risk alone,
however imminent, is it anticipatory self-defense-a principle as severely
questioned and debatable as necessity? Should environmental self-pro-
tection, if recognized, be defined by its own set of factors for its actual
exercise-such as the extent and probability of injury, the likelihood that
protected measures will be effective, and the nature and extent of envi-
ronmental damage, if any, that might be caused by these protective meas-
ures? Or are the traditional prerequisites for the actual exercise of self-
defense-necessity and proportionality-sufficient?
Of course, chapter VII does not limit the Security Council's powers
to those that a state would have when acting under article 51 in self-
defense.26 The Security Council can authorize a state or states to use
force, even when the individual or collective use of force without such
authorization would be illegal. If, "however, there is a right or even nas-
cent right of environmental self-protection for states individually-even
in the narrow context of maritime disasters-recognizing environmental
risk as a threat to peace within the meaning of chapter VII becomes a
smaller step than it might appear.
Mr. Machado (Brazil): Whatever the merits of the draft resolution
before us, discussion of a right of individual or collective environmental
self-protection is inappropriate and frightening in its ramifications. Eco-
logical security is tantamount to military security. Article 51 preserves a
right of self-defense to states in the absence of Security Council action.
Surely no one would claim that a state could unilaterally use force to
respond to a perceived threat to its environment if the Security Council
has not acted.
In the absence of military conflict or deliberate infliction of environ-
mental damage, allowing enforcement action by the Security Council
against a perceived environmental threat would be a particularly one-
sided authority. Countries without the veto power might find themselves
subject to enforcement action for mismanagement of a natural resource
within national boundaries, but would the permanent members allow en-
25. The Corfu Channel Case (Alb v. U.K.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
26. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and secur-
ity." U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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forcement action for their damage to a vital global resource such as the
earth's atmosphere? The answer is obvious.
The President (Mr. Urquiola, Cuba): There is another troublesome
matter yet to be addressed since the proposed resolution is being put for-
ward in response to a perceived environmental risk and not an actual
accident. By its terms, enforcement action under article 42 only may be
taken "[s]hould the Security Council consider that measures provided for
in article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate."27
There has been no discussion or determination on this issue. Cuba op-
posed Resolution 67828 authorizing the use of force against Iraq on pre-
cisely those grounds: that no determination had been made that article
41 sanctions were inadequate.
Mr. Tan (Malaysia): There are several possible responses to the rep-
resentative from Cuba with respect to the adoption of Resolution 678
and its precedential value in this context. In authorizing force against
Iraq, this Council may not have been utilizing article 42-the resolution
stated only that the Council was acting pursuant to chapter VII. Per-
haps the general authority of chapter VII was an adequate legal ground,
or perhaps the Council was recognizing the right of states to engage in
collective self-defense against Iraq under article 51 and thus not author-
izing U.N. enforcement action at all. Either justification avoids the prob-
lematic determinations of whether the Council can take article 42 action
before the completion of article 43 agreements on contribution of forces
29
and whether article 41 sanctions are adequate.
Even if article 42 was being applied in Resolution 678, members in
favor of the resolution may have determined the economic sanctions
would be inadequate without having made an explicit determination to
that effect. In any event, it is far from clear that the inadequacy of article
41 sanctions is an absolute prerequisite to article 42 enforcement action,
or that this resolution is pursuant to article 42.
The President: The text of chapter VII speaks for itself. Article 42
is the only provision in the Charter that authorizes the U.N. to take "ac-
tion by air, sea, or land forces,"3 and article 42 only authorizes such
action if article 41 measures are found to be inadequate. 3' The absence
27. Id. art. 42.
28. Security Council Resolution 678, Nov. 29, 1990, U.N. Doc. No. S/RES/678 (1990).
29. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1. Article 43 requires all U.N. members "make available
to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements,
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of
maintaining international peace and security." Id.
30. Id. art. 42.
31. Id. art. 41.
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of article 43 agreements does not preclude action being taken under arti-
cle 42, as evidenced by article 106, which specifies one method for gath-
ering of a Security Council force "[p]ending the coming into force" of
article 43 agreements.32 The Council is not precluded from garnering
forces in alternative ways, as article 42 states that action by U.N. forces
"may include ... operations by ... forces of Members of the United
Nations. ' 33 A state is not obligated, however, to provide forces under
article 42 unless it has concluded an article 43 agreement.
If Resolution 678 is viewed as merely Council recognition of collec-
tive self-defense, the Council's discussion of the adequacy of economic
sanctions was odd indeed because it has always been assumed that the
prerequisite of "necessity" for self-defense is satisfied by a large-scale,
illegal armed attack. Reliance on the penumbra of chapter VII as au-
thorization for coercive force is a truly frightening prospect, since such
reliance would only be necessary in cases when the use of coercion failed
to fall within the almost limitless authorization of a "threat to peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.",34 Sweden's resolution autho-
rizes access by U.N.-authorized personnel to the plant site without
Ukraine's consent, and as such goes beyond the type of sanctions not
involving the use of force contemplated within article 41. Unless and
until the Council has determined that article 41 measures are inadequate
to remedy the environmental situation in Ukraine, Cuba cannot endorse
the proposed resolution.
Mr. Azouka (Nigeria): Whatever ambiguity pervades Resolution
678, the resolution before us is even more flawed, as the preceding discus-
sion illustrates. Sweden characterizes this resolution as calling for "en-
forcement action." Yet there is nothing in the resolution that indicates
the specific provisions on which the resolution is grounded-only the re-
grettably common usage of the phrase "acting under chapter VII." This
phrase was utilized when the International Tribunal for the former Yu-
goslavia was established on May 25, 1993, the most recent analogy to
what Sweden proposes in its resolution. The Report of the Secretary-
General of May 3, 199331 on the proposed establishment of such a tribu-
nal concluded that the Tribunal was properly established under chapter
VII (presumably article 41) and under article 29 of chapter V, which
32. Id. art. 106.
33. Id. art. 42 (emphasis added).
34. Id. art. 39.
35. Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3,
1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993).
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grants the Security Council power to establish "such subsidiary organs as
it deems necessary for the performance of its functions."36 Is the pro-
posed resolution enforcement action under article 42, in which case the
President has raised a relevant concern about article 41 sanctions, or is it
enforcement action under article 41 or the general authority of chapter
VII, in which case we need not be concerned with the adequacy or inade-
quacy of article 41 sanctions before approving the resolution?
There is yet another possible justification for the resolution under
chapter VII. When the Council makes a determination under article 39
that there is a threat to peace, as the proposed resolution does, article 40
authorizes the Council to "call upon the parties concerned to comply
with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable"
37
before making a recommendation under article 39 or making a decision
under article 41 or 42. The words "call upon" raise their own problem of
interpretation. These words are often used in resolutions in the sense of
"recommend"-and article 40 cryptically states its measures are without
prejudice to the rights of the parties concerned-although in article 41
the term is clearly synonymous with "order." Whatever the legal effect
of provisional measures, the intent of article 40 is to authorize the Coun-
cil to call for measures to prevent a threat to peace from developing into
a breach of peace, a power appropriate to the conditions in the Ukraine
we are considering today.
Article 39 offers yet another alternative-a clearly nonbinding "rec-
ommendation" to maintain or restore international peace and security.
The resolution as currently drafted sheds little light on whether the
Council is mandating or recommending compliance with its terms. In
the Certain Expenses case38 the International Court of Justice indicated
that the peacekeeping forces in the Middle East and Congo did not con-
stitute enforcement action because they were not directed against a state
without its consent. The resolution does not explicitly call for anything
that necessitates Ukraine's consent or, a fortiori, imposes measures with-
out that state's consent. Investigation and gathering of evidence on con-
ditions at the plant do not necessarily entail mandatory on-site
inspections or compulsory production of documents. Likewise, the com-
mittee's report on "measures to be taken" need not mean that the com-
mittee itself, or the Council, is empowered to take such measures without
further resolutions. As there is nothing in the resolution that explicitly
calls for measures to be taken without Ukraine's consent, the resolution
36. Id. art. 29.
37. Id. art. 40.
38. Certain Expenses of The United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20).
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need not be predicated on either article 41 or 42. The question remains
whether the Council would be calling for provisional measures under ar-
ticle 40, which may or may pot be binding on Ukraine, or would be mak-
ing a recommendation under article 39, which is not binding. In either
case the provisional measures or recommendations would not be enforce-
ment measures and therefore would not fall within the exception to the
prohibition in article 2(7) on intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of
any state.39
If the resolution is viewed by this Council as enforcement action
under chapter VII, it suffers from the same flaw that has generated so
much controversy over the actions taken in Somalia and Kuwait. Legiti-
macy of Security Council action must start with clearly articulated legal
grounds for action and clearly articulated goals and limits for such ac-
tion. How far does this resolution go? Can the Committee or Council
mandate closure or dismantling of the reactors, as Sweden has suggested?
Could either body assume control of operation of the reactors? Although
we have discussed what limits there are to initial authorization of en-
forcement action, what prescribes the limits or duration of such action?
Also of relevance to the resolution now before us is article 34 of
chapter VI, which authorizes the Council to "investigate any dispute, or
any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a
dispute, in order to determine whether [it] is likely to endanger the main-
tenance of international peace and security"40 and, if it so determines, to
recommend appropriate remedies under article 36(l).41 Sweden may do
well to consider whether the conditions at Chernobyl are in reality a po-
tential threat to peace, better addressed under chapter VI in the manner
described in article 34. Because the proposed resolution as drafted spe-
cifically finds a threat to peace and states that the Council is acting pur-
suant to chapter VII, amendment would be necessary to address this
crisis under the more limited parameters of chapter VI.
Given these concerns, and the inchoate nature of the perceived dan-
ger at this time, this dispute is more appropriately addressed on a re-
gional basis as contemplated under chapter VIII of the Charter.42 The
39. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 7.
40. Id. art. 34.
41. "The Security Council may at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article
33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjust-
ments." Id. art. 36, para. 1.
42. U.N. Members "shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes
through regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Secur-
ity Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 52. Chapter VIII continues that "no enforcement action
shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization
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Pan-European Energy Charter and the Nuclear Energy Protocol consti-
tute one regional attempt to address the wide-ranging potential nuclear
crisis of the entire Commonwealth of Independent States. However,
once the Security Council embarks on any enforcement action, the pos-
sibilities for resolution by negotiation are diminished. Often, the enforce-
ment action assumes a life of its own, more easily expanded than limited
or curtailed. The Ukranian crisis is not yet at that point of urgency.
The President: Regardless of whether the resolution calls for en-
forcement action or not, the resolution before us is clearly a substantive
matter governed by the voting procedures of article 27, paragraph 3, re-
quiring the concurring votes of each of the permanent members. The
Council will now vote on the draft resolution:
A vote was taken by show of
hands as follows:











The President: In accordance with the principle established by the
Security Council on resolutions subject to the unanimity rule, abstention
by a permanent member of the Council does not necessarily render the
Council's decision invalid. Since I, as President, as well as representative
of Cuba, consider the resolution to be one of substance, I rule that the
resolution is rejected because one of the permanent members of the Se-
curity Council voted against it.
Ms. Jarring (Sweden): The representative from Nigeria has touched
on an issue of some importance as to whether this resolution might be
more appropriately limited in its application. In light of the previous
votes, I now propose an amendment to our resolution. The language of
the resolution as amended would read as follows:
of the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 53. Article 54 further provides that the Security
Council shall be kept informed of such regional solutions. Id. art. 54.
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The Security Council,
Recalling the accident of April 26, 1986, at the Chernobyl
Nuclear Power Plant, which resulted in a release of radiation
throughout the former Soviet Union, Europe, and much of
North America,
Considering the loss of life, property, economic disruption
and fear caused by that release,
Expressing grave alarm at reports of improper and inade-
quate maintenance and operation of the plant, deterioration in
these conditions, and in the structures themselves,
Committing to take effective measures to eliminate the im-
minent risk of another accident occurring,
Believing that the establishment of a committee of experts
will contribute to ensuring that such risk is eliminated,
1. Resolves to appoint a committee of experts with the
assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency to re-
ceive or to hear such evidence, statements, and testimonies, and
to conduct such inquiries as it may find necessary on the condi-
tions of operation and maintenance of the four Chernobyl nu-
clear reactors, and to report to the Security Council at the
earliest possible time;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to implement urgently
the present resolution and, in particular, to make practical ar-
rangements for the effective functioning of the committee at the
earliest time, and to report periodically to the Council.
It is our position that the committee is being established under arti-
cle 29, 4 under the heading "Procedure," as a subsidiary organ to assist
the Security Council, and its task is confined to an inquiry and not an
investigation; that is, it must receive information from the government
concerned rather than seek facts itself on its own initiative. I move this
resolution and ask that it be voted on at once, if there is no discussion.
Ms. Mironova (Ukraine): The artificial line that has been drawn be-
tween an "inquiry" and an "investigation" is not convincing. Without
the reference to chapter VII, the amended resolution at the very least
calls for an investigation under article 34 of chapter VI, which is a sub-
stantive decision. Indeed, as previous comments would suggest, there is
still room to consider the amended resolution as an exercise of the Coun-
cil's powers under article 39 or 40.
43. Id. art. 29.
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When the Charter of the United Nations was being drafted at the
San Francisco conference, there was much discussion about the proce-
dure the Security Council must follow when the question arises as to
whether a resolution is of a procedural or of a substantive nature.' At
that time there was also an agreement among the United States, United
Kingdom, China, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with
which France also associated itself, that stated that the question of
whether a matter is substantive or procedural is itself a substantive ques-
tion subject to veto power.45
Mr. Bogdan (Nauru): It is not clear what binding effect, if any, the
San Francisco Statement would have on those five states, much less on
states not party to that agreement. As early as 1949 in an attempt to
limit obstructionist use of the veto, the General Assembly in Resolution
267 (III) recommended to the Council that the establishment of a subsid-
iary organ was a procedural matter, although the "terms of reference" of
such organs were not if the organ "were given authority to take steps
which, if taken by the Security Council, would be subject to the veto or if
the conferring of such authority would constitute a non-procedural deci-
sion."14 6 The same resolution recommended that Council members seek
to agree to forebear exercise of the veto on whether a matter is or is not
procedural when a majority of votes have already been cast in favor of
finding the matter to be procedural. I also would like to point out to the
permanent members article 103, which states that in the event of a con-
flict between the U.N. Charter and any other agreement (such as the San
Francisco Statement), a member's obligations under the Charter shall
prevail.47
The President: Even with the proposed amendments, this commit-
tee is being set up in connection with the performance of its function in
the maintenance of international peace and security. As such, it is my
opinion that the establishment of such a body is subject to the voting
procedure of article 27, paragraph 3; that is to say it must be treated as a
vote on a substantive question to which the unanimity rule applies. I
now put to the vote the following question: Should the vote to be taken
on the amended draft resolution be considered a procedural vote?
44. See Doc. 1149 111/l1, 11 U.N.C.I.O. 103, 122-25 (1945); U.N. Doc. 922 111/1/44, 11
U.N.C.I.O. 454, 455 (1945); U.N. Doc. 897 111/1/42, 11 U.N.C.I.O. 430, 435, 438-440 (1945).
45. Doc. 852 III/1/37(I), 11 U.N.C.I.O. 710 (1945).
46. G.A. Res. 267 (III), 3d. Sess., 195th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/578 (1949), reprinted in 2
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS: RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 252
(Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1973).
47. U.N. CHARTER. art. 103.
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A vote was taken by show of
hands as follows:












The President: I consider the vote which has just taken place as a
decision to consider the vote on the resolution as one of substance be-
cause a permanent member cast a negative vote against consideration of
the resolution as procedural. The substantive/procedural question is it-
self an issue of substance. If there are no other speakers I should like to
proceed now to take a vote on the amended resolution submitted by
Sweden.
A vote was taken by show of
hands as follows:











The President: The result of the vote is as follows:
The draft resolution is rejected, having failed to obtain the concur-
ring vote of a permanent member. Given the outcome of the vote, it is
not necessary to determine whether Ukraine was required to abstain
under article 27, paragraph 3 as a party to a dispute.
Ms. Jarring (Sweden): I must object to the President's interpreta-
tion of the vote on the amended resolution. The matter is clearly one of
[Vol. 27:893
MEETING OF U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
procedure, and the President has thwarted the will of a majority of the
Council by interpreting it to be otherwise. When a point of order is
raised, the President must put to the vote the contested ruling. Under
Rule 30 of our rules of procedure and the aforementioned resolution of
the General Assembly, the President's ruling on a point of order shall
stand unless overruled by a procedural vote of ten of the seventeen mem-
bers of the Council.48
The President: The question of whether a vote is procedural or sub-
stantive can only be decided by the Council by a positive vote in which
the permanent members concur. The amended resolution is rejected be-
cause one of the permanent members of the Security Council voted
against it.
Ms. Jarring (Sweden): I must reiterate that the President has
thwarted the will of this Council. I therefore propose a simple draft reso-
lution to this effect:
The Security Council.
Resolves that the matter of the conditions at Chernobyl be
taken off the list of matters of which the Council is seized.
There is no question that removal of an item from our
agenda is procedural, and frees the General Assembly to take
up the matter under article 12. I move this resolution and ask
that it be voted on at once, if there is no discussion.
A vote was taken by show of
hands, and the resolution was
adopted by thirteen votes to three.












48. See SYDNEY D. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 100, 167
(2d ed. 1988).
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The President: The Chernobyl matter is accordingly removed from
the agenda of the Security Council.
